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Book Review
INCLUSIVE EQUALITY: RELATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION IN CANADA, by CotLeen
Sheppard 1

HESTER LESSARD 2
IF YOU ASKED AN EQUALITY ACTIVIST or critical scholar to describe the Supreme
Court of Canada's equality jurisprudence, the likely answer would be something
along the lines of "bewildering, contradictory, fractured, and despair-inducing."
There have been moments of relief-for example, an auspicious beginning in
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia3 and a short-lived consensus with
respect to the doctrinal formulation of equality in Law v Canada (Ministerof
Employment and Immigration).4 Overall, however, the equality case law provides
a complicated and difficult legacy. In Inclusive Equality, Professor Colleen
Sheppard does not set out to untangle or expose the doctrinal contradictions,
although she does some of that along her way. Rather, her aim is optimistically
creative: to articulate a new concept of equality-namely, inclusive equalitythat synthesizes the key insights of constitutional equality and statutory antidiscrimination jurisprudence, incorporating revised methodological approaches
and new theoretical commitments. Moreover, she elaborates how her concept
of inclusive equality can shift our gaze away from courtroom battles and can
facilitate efforts to instill equality norms by means other than litigation.
Most would agree that the endorsement in our Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms5 jurisprudence of substantive rather than formal equality is one of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010) 256 pages.
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
[1989] 1 SCR 143.
[1999] 1 SCR497.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982,
c11.
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its most significant and positive achievements. The divisions and contradictions
alluded to above arise over the question of what substantive equality means and
requires in specific cases. Indeed, much critique is taken up with pointing out
how courts have failed to live up to their commitment to substantive equality
and with lamenting the return to formal equality analysis. Sheppard shares those
views but takes us back a step-not to formal equality and not to a rejection of
substantive equality but to a reconsideration of the latter's adequacy. She argues
that the concept of substantive equality, in addition to offering too little guidance
to decision makers, falls short of grappling with the structures and processes
that reproduce inequalities. Hence, Sheppard identifies a need to build on our
jurisprudential foundations to devise a new, expanded concept of equality.
Sheppard turns to this ambitious task quickly. The opening chapter of
Inclusive Equality concerns statutory responses to discrimination and inequality.
She starts by noting the historical background of pervasive inequalities that
* became the subject of comprehensive statutory legal reform efforts in Canada
only in the aftermath World War II. She does not provide a detailed history
of legal developments. Her focus, rather, is on major conceptual shifts in the
understanding of inequalities. In particular, Shepard focuses on the shift from
viewing inequalities as consequences of natural forces beyond the reach of law
or beyond the responsibility of society or governments, to viewing them as
socially constructed-the products of relationships, attitudes, and practices. This
latter realization, she emphasizes, poses immense challenges to law and policy.
A sophisticated grasp of the relation between law and social change is necessary.
Understanding is also required of the interplay between large-scale global factors,
societal and institutional norms, and individual values, actions, and beliefs.
Sheppard distills from our statutory anti-discrimination jurisprudence
important insights that arise from grappling with this challenge: the proposition
that discrimination is often the adverse effect of neutral rules and policies rather
than the work of individual "bad apples"; the recognition of the phenomenon of
systemic discrimination; the development of more complex, programmatic, and
preventive remedies; and the emergence of an understanding of the complicated
interplay between overlapping and intersecting identities and social disadvantage.
In giving this overview, Sheppard also renders more precise a key distinction for
her delineation of inclusive equality-namely that between adverse effects and
systemic discrimination. She notes that courts too often equate the two, thereby
failing to give full play to the systemic dimension in diagnosing inequalities.
Systemic discrimination encompasses both adverse and direct effects as well
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as deeply rooted attitudes, cultural norms, practices, and processes. In sum,
in the introductory chapter, Sheppard both identifies and clarifies valuable
achievements in this area of Canadian law. In particular, she highlights an
emphatically relational, socially-embedded understanding of inequality and a
conceptual vocabulary-including the notions of adverse effects and systemic
discrimination-to aid us in addressing specific inequalities.
Chapter two similarly engages in a synthesizing and clarifying analysis, this
time with respect to constitutional equality jurisprudence. Sheppard highlights
the positive achievements in this area, in particular the rejection of formal
equality in favour of a substantive conception that focuses on adverse effects
and unequal outcomes rather than simply on differential treatment. She also
examines recurrent doctrinal problems that have undermined the effectiveness
of the jurisprudence, namely a rigid, technical notion of equality's comparative
framework; an unresolved tension between equality narratives that focus on.
group dimensions of disadvantage and those that focus on dimensions that take
individual dignity-harms as their touchstone; and the failure to keep pace with
shifting understandings of the nature and role of the state.
Chapter two also provides us with the book's key contribution-its elaboration
of the concept of inclusive equality. Sheppard argues that inclusive equality builds
on the judicial commitment to substantive equality-articulated largely in terms
of attention to unequal effects and outcomes-and adds to it a distinct focus
on processes, both systemic and structural, of inclusion and exclusion in social,
institutional, and political decision-making practices. This focus on processes and
relationships, Sheppard proposes, arises out of concepts of systemic discriminationthat, although present in our current jurisprudence, need to be given a more
explicit and central role. Sheppard's conception of inclusive equality-with its
substantive as well as procedural/relational dimensions-is particularly crucial
to the task of crafting remedies and responses that are transformative rather than
merely corrective. Such remedies and responses engage with those features of our
current arrangements that reproduce and sustain inequalities over time.'
Sheppard ends chapter two on a practical note, with a revision of current
equality doctrine that both simplifies and expands the existing framework in
order to reflect her conception of inclusive equality. The revision reconfigures the
work that conceptions of substantive equality do in terms of two inquiries-the
6.

Nancy Fraser makes a similar point using the distinction between affirmative and
transformative remedies for injustice. Justice Interruptus:CriticalReflections on the
"Postsocialist"Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997) ch 1.
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first*into types of harmful effects and the second into the degree of harm. A third
inquiry adds the lens of inclusion and directs analysis at "exclusionary processes
and structural/systemic dimensions of harm."7
The third chapter takes up the methodological implications of Sheppard's
inclusive equality framework. Again, she synthesizes, reworks, and expands existing
approaches. She notes the jurisprudential commitment to contextualization but
argues for a more nuanced methodology that engages fully with micro-, meso-,
and macro-levels of contextual analysis. The micro-level of analysis makes space
for the experiential knowledge of those claiming equality harms. Drawing on
feminist theory, Sheppard notes the difficult questions about voice, authenticity,
and essentialism that attend reliance on experiential knowledge. She advises that
these concerns can be countered by knowledge drawn from contextual analysis
at the meso- and macro-levels. The meso-level of analysis looks at institutional
processes and social relations and is crucial to the remedial effectiveness of an
inclusive equality analysis. Through such analysis, we gain understanding not
simply of the harms of inequality but of the ways in which it is reproduced over
time despite corrective measures aimed at outcomes and effects. The macro-level
directs our gaze to larger structural and ideological features such as the shift in
political rationalities from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism in the last decades
of the twentieth century. Examination of the macro-level aids our understanding
of micro-level experiences and the seeming intractability of exclusionary mesolevel processes. It also ensures that remedies take account of both the dangers and
opportunities presented by larger historical and socio-economic changes.
Chapters two and three provide us with a map for equality law that retools
old concepts, methods, and achievements. The map also sharpens our sense of
why these past approaches are important and supplements them with a set of
additional inquiries and new benchmarks targeted at exclusionary norms, social
relations, and processes. The fourth chapter is a case study of sexual harassment
that puts Sheppard's framework to work, reinforcing the more abstract and
methodological points made in the preceding chapters. Chapters five and six
discuss two theoretical commitments-conceptions of caring and principles of
democracy-that Sheppard argues should explicitly shape and inform equality
concepts and anti-discrimination law. The chapter on caring draws on wellknown feminist literature focused on normative and ethical dimensions of
relations of care. The salience of this literature to theories of equality lies in its
illumination of the prcfoundly relational character of caring, its embrace of social
interdependencies, and its sophistication in navigating the distinction between
7.

Supra note 1 at 63.
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caring relations that oppress and those that nurture growth and equality. 'Thus
this literature offers a set of useful tools and concepts for analyzing the relational
and systemic nature of inequalities and for crafting more positive, inclusive
processes and relationships. As well, a focus on caring encourages us to enlarge
our horizons beyond the individual and beyond those that we resemble in order
to include distinctly different "others" in conceptions of our community.
Chapter six envisions a role for democratic principles that is similar to the
role of theories of caring. Sheppard notes that while debates on the meaning and
import of democracy are many and diverse, "the fundamental starting point"
of democratic theory is "a normative acceptance of the basic idea of equality. 8
Sheppard relies centrally on Iris Marion Young's conception of "communicative
democracy."9 Young's work focuses on institutional and political processes
of deliberation and on the structural constraints that inhibit and prevent full
participation in democratic societies. 'Thus it provides a close fit with Sheppard's
main point that equality concepts need to expand to encompass more direct
attention to exclusionary processes at the meso-level of institutional and social
relations and to systemic and structural impediments to equality. Indeed,
Sheppard argues forcefully that democratic principles need to be extended into
the private sphere and that more democracy in workplaces, families, corporations,
educational institutions, and other civil society associations generally produces
more equality. As in the case of theories of care, Sheppard is attuned to the
problems that democracy presents for equality. Here those problems take the
form of formal and functional exclusions and of majoritarian denials of minority
views and rights. In discussing mechanisms and approaches that can resolve these
problems, Sheppard reinforces the point that by linking equality to democracy,
equality becomes a more transformative concept. In short, a focus on democracy
demands that we attend to decision-making processes and practices rather than
simply to adverse effects and substantive outcomes.
Sheppard's vision of inclusive equality is ambitious in its reach. It requires
the energy and will to restructure relations and practices that many of us view
as normal, unobjectionable, and even virtuous, as in the case of market relations
premised on self-interest. Sheppard concludes her book with a short chapter

8.
9.

Ibidat 119.
Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 40. Although Young
locates her conception of democracy within the model of deliberative democracy, she prefers
the term communicative democracy because too often the term deliberation connotes "the
primacy of argument, dispassionateness, and order in communication," qualities that can
exclude from participation persons from less privileged segments of society (ibid).
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that identifies three dimensions that are crucial to the restructuring process. The
first is the reinforcement of the agency of equality claimants. The trajectory of
much equality analysis tends to foreground harm and victimization to the point
of reducing claimants to their injuries and foreclosing rather than enhancing
democracy and self-government." Sheppard draws on Kathryn Abrams' notion
of "partial agency," which respects the capacities for action and freedom of
individuals while at the same time acknowledging structural aspects of their
subordination.11 The second dimension is the promotion of solidarity, a feature
that flows logically from Sheppard's emphasis on caring and that is a focal point
in social movement activism around equality issues. The third dimension is the
requirement that public responsibility for equality be sustained and embraced
rather than diminished.
Who is this book for and in what directions does it point? Inclusive Equality's
natural audience is equality activists both inside and outside of law, judges, and
the curious public, as well as teachers, scholars, and students in the fields of law
and socio-legal studies. The book is written in a clear, accessible style. Charts
and diagrams are used to summarize complex, multi-layered arguments. Where
legal doctrine needs to be explained in order to make a practical or theoretical
point, it is done in a way that all can understand. Sheppard's development of the
concept of inclusive equality. is *carefully grounded in both jurisprudence and
theoretical literature. The conceptual, strategic, and doctrinal pieces fit together,
and concerns are anticipated and explained. Inclusive Equality could easily form
the basis of a seminar in equality and anti-discrimination law. The chapters
are short and succinct. In a classroom, the chapters could be supplemented
with cases that illustrate the main points and theoretical readings that expand
on the foundations of Sheppard's concept of inclusive equality. Inclusive
Equality challenges both mainstream and critical orthodoxies-in particular,
the assumption that substantive equality provides the best possible doctrinal
rendering of legal equality norms. Finally, the book is not tightly tied to a specific
moment in the development of equality jurisprudence, thus avoiding the risk of
becoming immediately dated.
Inclusive Equality also provides a direction for strategic litigation and a
framework for factum writing that is attentive to precedent while at the same
time marking out a path through some of the more exasperating and recurrent

10. See Wendy Brown, States of Injury:Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, f 995) at 27.
11. "Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory" (1995) 95 Colum L Rev
304.
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tensions in the jurisprudence. It pushes us to think more imaginatively and more
concretely about remedies, drawing on our particular knowledge and experiences
at home and work. In addition, Inclusive Equality looks outside the courtroom
and underlines the salience of localized institutional strategies to achieving
equality, offering direct and helpful guidance on such efforts. Thus it is a useful
and inspiring resource for persons concerned with equity and equality issues in
workplaces, public and private institutions, and community organizations.
Perhaps Inclusive Equality's most compelling feature is that it is such an
optimistic and hopeful book. It is animated by a commitment to justice, by a
belief that inequalities are social artifacts that can be undone by social activism,
and by a firm conviction that lawyers can assist in this broad transformative social
process. As such, it is a refreshing antidote to the tendency in legal academic
circles to allow case law to circumscribe our possibilities for achieving justice and
equality in the wider fields of life and politics.

